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1. Introduction  
An increasing number of countries have switched over the last 15 years to a new monetary 
policy regime that has become known as inflation targeting and can be seen as a potential 
remedy for persistent inflation. However, other remedies discussed and suggested in the 
literature include: the creation of an independent and conservative central bank, or the set up 
of an inflation performance contract for the central bank governor. Inflation targeting indeed 
can involve elements of all two remedies. By announcing a rather low inflation target and 
creating some degree of commitment to it, inflation targeting can help to reduce inflation and 
to maintain price stability.  
In this context, inflation targeting has been adopted in the 1990s by many industrialised 
countries (New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Australia and 
Switzerland). Also, it is now recognised that some emerging market economies (Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, and South Africa) and transition economies 
(Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) launched during the same period monetary policy 
strategies containing many of the elements of the inflation targeting adopted in more 
advanced economies. All countries happen to be open economies, with different degrees of 
restrictions, if any, on trade and capital mobility (Svensson, 1999). Thus, the adoption of 
explicit inflation targets in some industrialised countries was often a practical response to 
difficulties with their use of an exchange rate peg, which had failed to achieve low and stable 
inflation and had been subject to dramatic speculative attacks (i.e., the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Finland). Similarly, the Asian financial and currency crisis in the 1990s and its 
fallout in Latin America and Eastern Europe have also convinced many observers that dirty 
flexible or pegged exchange rate regimes are crisis prone (Eichengreen 2002). As a result, 
emerging market and transition economies opted for an inflation-targeting monetary policy 
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rule in combination with exchange rate flexibility providing thus a coherent alternative to 
exchange-rate based monetary policy strategies.  
However, market conditions in emerging market and transition economies may require 
modifications of the typical inflation-targeting policy rule that has been recommended for 
industrialised economies with more developed financial markets. In particular, a country's 
size, openness, capital mobility, and degree of financial markets development would matter 
(Taylor, 2000). In this respect, a substantial body of literature has emphasised the advantages 
of the inflation targeting (Leiderman and Svensson, 1995; Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997, 
Bernanke et al., 1999; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Neuman and von Hagen, 2002). 
Also, work by Ball (1999), Svensson (1999), and Battini, Harrison and Millard (2000) 
emphasized the importance of open economy considerations. Finally, a number of recent 
studies have analysed the initial effects of inflation targeting for emerging market and 
transition economies (Masson et al., 1997; Orlowski 2000; Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; 
Mishkin and Savastano, 2002; Amato and Gerlach, 2002; Jonas and Mishkin, 2003). Authors 
like Mishkin (2000), adopting a rather favourable position, argue that inflation targeting has 
the advantage to be easily understood by the public of these economies, which have often a 
past history of monetary mismanagement. On the other hand, Masson et al. (1997), taking a 
more cautious view, argue that the absence of reliable procedures for forecasting inflation, 
the difficulty of maintaining de facto independence for the central bank, and the lack of an 
anti-inflationary history may preclude the establishment of transparent framework of 
monetary policy and thus any attempt at inflation targeting.  
Nevertheless, most of these studies failed to distinguish between open-economy and 
emerging market-country aspects of inflation targeting. And they have not yielded conclusive 
results on the viability of inflation-targeting regime in countries opening their economies to 
international capital flows under flexible exchange rates, such as in some emerging market 
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and transition economies.  The purpose of this paper is to examine whether inflation targeting 
offers a viable alternative to an exchange-rate based monetary policy regime in countries 
opening their economies to capital flows, especially for financial and macroeconomic 
dynamic stability. According to Willett (2002), recent studies in open economy suggest that 
in general optimal rules for using interest rate adjustments to meet inflation targets will 
become more complicated in open economies and that simple inflation targeting can set up 
dangerous dynamic instabilities. Moreover, an especially serious and very relevant criticism 
of inflation targeting emphasises that the increasing capital account liberalisation with 
exchange rate flexibility, may cause financial instability in emerging market and transition 
economies with inflation targeting (Mishkin, 2001).  
Indeed, the role played by capital account liberalisation in the 1990s financial crises, has 
lead many researchers to reassess the implications of capital mobility. A bi-polar solution 
for the choice of exchange rate regimes has been recommended by some authors suggesting 
adjustment of exchange arrangements to the new environment of increasing capital mobility 
(Fischer, 2001). Others argued against the excessive volatility in the financial markets 
associated with free capital movements suggesting capital controls to limit capital mobility 
(Williamson, 2000; Wyplosz, 2001). Both of these views rely on the so-called impossible 
trinity of fixed exchange rates, monetary independence, and free capital mobility. Inflation 
targeting being an alternative to exchange-rate based monetary policy regime, another way to 
think about inflation targeting is that it is an essential part of a three-part policy (or trinity) 
that also includes flexible exchange rate and free capital mobility. Nevertheless, an important 
question remains. Do inflation targeters have to use also capital controls against the excessive 
volatility in the financial markets under flexible exchange rates and free capital movements 
or they have to use exchange rate adjustments in the environment of increasing capital 
mobility for helping to maintain financial and macroeconomic stability?  In this respect, the 
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weak response of exchange rate regime choices to capital account mobility, established 
empirically by von Hagen and Zhou (2005), suggests that policymakers have a tendency to 
utilise capital controls to help manage the exchange rate regimes1. Then the question is: could 
this tendency to control international capital movements be justifiable in the inflation-
targeting framework?  
To answer to this question, we examine the stability conditions in a simple dynamic 
macro model with imperfect capital mobility, flexible exchange rates and flexible inflation 
targeting (Svensson, 1997 and 1999). Under flexible inflation targeting, the central bank aims 
at two objectives, hitting the inflation and output gap targets. A specific feature of this 
monetary strategy is that it takes the weight the central bank attaches to output stabilisation 
relative to inflation as given. This preference parameter determines how aggressive (or 
conservative in the sense of Rogoffs classic 1985 article) or accommodative the response 
of the central bank is to deviations of inflation from its target value. In this framework, the 
degree of capital mobility and the degree of flexibility in inflation targeting are two critical 
features. We show that a low degree of flexibility in inflation targeting (i.e., central banks 
response is aggressive toward inflation) with a high degree of international capital mobility 
implies a dynamically unstable solution in this simple rational expectations model. However, 
it seems possible to maintain stability under a low degree of flexibility in inflation targeting 
when we limit the degree of capital mobility. Finally, when authorities adopt a high degree of 
flexibility in inflation targeting, a dynamically stable solution can be attained under any 
degree of international capital mobility. In this sense, capital controls might help manage 
inflation-targeting regime. However, their effectiveness depends without doubt on the 
development of domestic monetary and financial markets.  
                                                 
1  Evidence provided by von Hagen and Zhou (2005) on the relationship between capital mobility and exchange 
rate regime in transition economies, shows a strong influence from exchange rate regime choices on 
restrictions on capital mobility, while the feedback effects are absent.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give out the model. 
In Section 3 we derive the optimal monetary policy rule. In Section 4, we present the general 
solution of the dynamic system. In Section 5, we study the stability of the dynamic system. 
Section 6 summarises the main conclusions.  
 
2. The Model  
We consider an open economy model described by an aggregate supply equation, an aggregate 
spending relationship and two equilibrium conditions in asset markets (foreign exchange and 
domestic money). Aggregate supply is given by a conventional Lucas supply function: 
                                            πε−π−π=
ey ,                                (1) 
where y  is the output gap, π  the inflation rate, eπ  the expected inflation rate, and πε  an 
inflationary (or supply side) shock. The aggregate demand depends on the expected real 
interest rate, )( ei π− , and the real exchange rate, s , as follows: 
          0 ,                   )( >γβε+γ+π−β−= de siy ,                     (2) 
where, i  is the nominal interest rate, peps f −+≡  the real exchange rate ( p denoting the 
domestic price level, fp the foreign price level in foreign currency and e  the nominal 
exchange rate), and dε  a demand shock. The foreign exchange market equilibrium is 
characterised by2 
         ,0,          , 0 )( >=+−−+− ysf
ef
ys eiiys ηηευηη &                             (3) 
                                                 
2 Equation (3) is derived from 0)(),( =−−+=+= ef eiiBKsyBCBKBCBP & , which is the balance of 
payment equilibrium condition. Trade balance BC depends on income, y, and real exchange rate, s, while 
capital balance BK depends on the differential of national and foreign bonds yields ( ef eii &−− ). 
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where sη  and yη  are respectively the real exchange rate-elasticity and the output-elasticity of 
the trade balance, fi  the foreign interest rate, fε  shock affecting the foreign exchange 
market. The parameter υ  denotes the degree of capital mobility (or the degree of capital 
liberalisation), which is assumed to be influenced by different measures of capital control or 
by institutional rules prevailing on internal financial markets, which can be modified to limit 
the speed of capital movements. Finally, the money market equilibrium is characterised by 
                                           miypm ε+φ−=− ,         0>φ ,                                         (4) 
 
where m  is the money supply and mε  is a shock affecting money demand. Since money 
supply is considered to be endogenous in the inflation-targeting framework, equation (4) 
implies that money supply growth rate in the long run will be equal to long term current and 
expected inflation rates: eππµ == (with dtdm/=µ ). If central bank searches for a credible 
inflation-targeting monetary policy, it must set a long-run money growth rate consistent with 
its inflation target: Tπµ = . Taking the time derivative and noting that µ=m&  and π=p& , 
equation (4) can be rewritten as follows:  
                                     
miy ε+φ−=π−µ &&& .               (4)  
Therefore, in order to satisfy long-term stationarity condition (i.e., 0====π iys &&&& ), 
monetary authority is constrained to set in the short-run a money growth rate consistent with 
the inflation target: m
T
m ε+π=ε+µ=µ && . On the opposite, optimal monetary policy could 
not be credible because current inflation rate will be systematically different from the 
rationally expected inflation rate by private sector in the inflation-targeting monetary policy 
regime. In this context, private sector will expect an inflation rate different from the inflation 
target announced by the central bank and inflation targeting will not be a nominal anchor for 
inflation expectations as assumed in the inflation-targeting literature. 
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3. The optimal monetary policy     
We interpret inflation targeting as stabilising around a given (long-run) inflation target Tπ  
(say 2 percent per year), as well as stabilising the output gap around an output gap target Ty . 
This can be represented by an intertemporal loss function for the central bank given by 
   dtttLEt ) exp()(
0
θ−∫
∞
,   with  [ ]22 )()(
2
1)( TT yytL −λ+π−π= ,   0 >θ .        (5)  
The loss function of the central bank increases with deviations from output-gap target and 
also increases if inflation deviates from an inflation target. The parameter λ  measures the 
weight policymakers attach to output stabilisation relative to inflation stabilisation such that 
∞<< λ0 . The case 0=λ coincides with a regime that Svensson (1997) describes as strict 
inflation targeting, whereas 0>λ describes flexible inflation targeting. The instrument of the 
monetary authority is the nominal interest rate and the central bank controls the nominal rate 
to affect output and inflation. For the purpose of this paper, we assume a zero output output-
gap target, 0=Ty , which can be interpreted as a situation when there is no long-run output 
target, in the sense that the long-run output target is not subject to choice but given by the 
capacity level of output (Taylor 1996 and Svensson 1996, 1999). Since the target for the 
output gap is zero there is no incentive to generate an inflation bias3.  
The optimal monetary policy is the solution to the sequence of single period decision 
problems of monetary authorities. These decision problems being independent, the central 
banks optimisation problem consists simply of minimising the one-period loss function, L , 
in (5). Thus, the first-order condition is given by   
                   )()( TT yyy π−π−=
π∂
∂
−λ     ⇒    )(1 TTyy π−π
λ
−= ,                    (6) 
 
                                                 
3 A positive output-gap target, 0>Ty , can be interpreted as a situation in which distortions in the economy 
(for example in the labour market) cause the socially preferred output level to exceed the natural output level.  
This introduces a benefit from inflation surprises and causes an inflation bias under discretion. 
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which leads to the following central banks optimal monetary policy rule (see, Appendix A): 
                                      



+−++= d
Te si εππλγβπ )(
11 ,                                     (7) 
where the time-consistent expected inflation rate of private sector is equal to the central 
banks inflation target Te ππ = in absence of persistent shocks (see equation A.4 in Appendix 
A). According to equation (7), it is optimal for the central bank to adjust the nominal interest 
rate upward to reflect expected inflation (to a full extent), the gap between current inflation 
and the inflation target, as well as increases in the real exchange rate and increases in the 
output gap due to a positive demand shock. In fact, this monetary policy rule, such as that 
proposed by Taylor (1993), expresses the central banks instrument, i , as a function of 
inflation and output gap. This policy rule calls for increase in the nominal interest rate 
whenever current inflation rises above the central banks inflation target. This ensures that a 
rise in current inflation leads the central bank to boost the nominal interest rate enough to 
raise the real interest rate, thereby contracting the real economy when current inflation rises. 
As noted by Svensson (2002), this type of simple interest rate rule has two advantages as a 
medium-term strategy for a monetary policy. First, it can easily be verified by outside 
observers and a commitment to the rule would therefore be technically feasible. Second, 
variants of the Taylor rule have been found to be relatively robust to different models, in the 
sense that they perform reasonably well in simulations with different models. 
 
4. The general solution of the system 
In order to determine the evolution of the economy over time, we must first solve the static 
equations of the optimal monetary rule (7) and equations (1) and (2) for the short-run 
solutions of expected inflation rate eπ and output y . These solutions are given by the 
following expressions:  
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          πε−π−πλ
+π=π )(1 Te ,                 (8a) 
                         )(1 Ty π−π
λ
−= ,                                        (8b) 
According to (8a) and (8b), a gap between current inflation and inflation target ( Tπ≠π ), 
induces changes in inflation expectations and output. In addition, expected inflation rate 
could be revised as reaction to the observed inflationary shocks. The interaction between the 
expected inflation rate and the other variables ( ,,, yiπ and s ) can generate a variety of 
dynamic configurations. Then the dynamic behaviour of the economy can be summarised in a 
two first-order differential equations in real exchange rate, s , and inflation rate, π . A linear 
approximation at the neighbourhood of the steady state ( s , π ) yields the following dynamic 
reduced form of the model (see Appendix A): 
   










π−π
−








ΦβΩ
φγ
+
Ω
−ΦβΩ
φγ
ΦΦ
=










π
sss
 1   
  
21
21
&
&
,              (9) 
where          01 >+≡Φ υ
η
β
γ s , 0or
)1(
1112 <≥





υβ+
βη
+





−
λβ≡Φ
y ,  
          and 0or  11
1
<≥
λβ
φ
−





−
λββ+
β
−≡Ω . 
The nominal exchange rate e  (thus the real exchange rate, s ) is a price clearing an efficient 
international financial market and it is not a predetermined state variable. It is free to make 
discrete jumps in response to news which includes all previously unanticipated current or 
future changes in exogenous variables and policy instruments. In contrast, π  is assumed to 
be predetermined4, in the sense that it reacts to economic news slowly without jumps. 
                                                 
4 The intuition behind this assumption is that inflation rate adjusts more slowly than exchange rate. In fact prices 
as well the inflation rate adjust with lags in a low inflation environment due to menu costs or other rigidities. 
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Steady state is characterised by the condition 0== π&&s . Note by A the state matrix of the 
two-equation dynamic system (9). The paths taken by real exchange rate and inflation rate in 
their dynamic adjustment to steady state equilibrium depend on the signs of determinant and 
trace of A:  
             11)det(
−ΩΦ−=Α    and   21
1)(tr ΦβΩ
φγ
+
Ω
−Φ=Α .  
Both signs depend on the degree of inflation-targeting flexibility, λ , i.e. the weight 
policymakers attach to output stabilisation relative to inflation stabilisation. In this two-
equation dynamic system with one predetermined and one non-predetermined variable, the 
existence of a unique convergent path therefore requires the presence of a stable and an 
unstable root. The transversality condition implies that rational agents will not choose 
unstable solutions and the jump variable will always attain the value required to put the 
system on the unique convergent trajectory. In the following, we examine the dynamic 
stability of the economy according to the choice of monetary authorities between different 
degrees of inflation-targeting flexibility. This leaves us with two qualitatively distinct phase 
diagram configurations in the s−π  space, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
5. The stability analysis of the dynamic system 
a) High degree of flexibility in inflation targeting  
We firstly consider the case of a high degree of inflation-targeting flexibility or the case of an 
accommodative response of central bank. In this case, the economy will be characterised by a 
local saddle-point configuration if the state matrix in (9) has a negative determinant, that is 
0)det( 11 <ΩΦ−=Α − . To obtain a negative determinant, Ω  must be strictly positive. This 
involves a high degree of inflation-targeting flexibility defined by the following condition: 
                 2
)1(  β
β+φ+β
>λ .                            (10) 
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Smaller interest-elasticity of money demand φ , and higher interest-elasticity of aggregate 
demand β  (more financial development) are stabilising factors in the sense that they extend 
the interval of λ  values compatible with the economic stability. Hence, in a contemporary 
economy with financial markets well developed, we can put more accent on inflation target.  
π
                            S         0=s&  
           
            0=π&  
 
 
                   s 
S
 
            (a). The case of a high degree of flexibility in inflation targeting 
 
π        0=π&        
           0=s&  
                       
s
 
 
            (b). The case of low inflation -targeting flexibility with capital controls 
Figure 1:  Phase diagrams of alternative dynamic configurations 
Under condition (10), the slope of 0=s&  locus in s−π  space is 0/ 21 >ΦΦ−  (Figure 1a), 
because 01 >Φ  and it is easily checked that 02 <Φ . The slope of 0=π&  locus in s−π  
space is [ ] 0)/(/ 21 >Φ−Φ φγβ . Note also that both 0=s&  and 0=π&  locus are upward 
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sloping, and the 0=s&  locus is steeper than the 0=π&  locus. The system has one stable 
eigenvalue and therefore saddle-point equilibrium.  
The intuition behind this saddle-point stability is the following. Under a high degree of 
inflation-targeting flexibility or an accommodative response of central bank, nominal interest 
rate rises moderately in response to an initial increase in inflation rate due to an exogenous 
shock. Given inflation expectations, real interest rate will rise and involves a reduction in 
spending on consumption and investment, and so a decrease in aggregate demand. The fall in 
aggregate demand allows reducing smoothly inflation pressure and expectations. The 
differential between the domestic and foreign inflation rates makes domestic goods more 
expensive than foreign goods (appreciation of real exchange rate), implying a trade balance 
deficit that is partially compensated by the decrease in the domestic demand of foreign goods 
due to diminution of the home revenue. On the other hand, higher domestic nominal and real 
interest rates encourage capital inflows leading to a further appreciation of real exchange rate. 
The rise in the nominal interest rate will be further moderated as a reaction to the 
appreciation of real exchange rate. Smooth adjustments in home nominal interest rate and 
inflation rate will induce restrained reactions in nominal exchange and real exchange rates 
due to the capital movements. Consequently, the degree of capital mobility does not play a 
crucial role in determining the stabilising or destabilising features of this dynamic system. 
Thus, central bank adopting a high degree of flexible inflation targeting that puts relatively 
low weight on inflation stabilisation goal seems to be able to eliminate the risk of 
macroeconomic and currency instability. This theoretical result seems to be supported by 
empirical evidence provided recently by Collins and Siklos (2004), suggesting that countries 
with explicit inflation targets were not overly aggressive toward inflation and supports 
Svenssons (1999) assertion that inflation-targeting central banks are flexible. 
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b) Stability under low inflation-targeting flexibility and low capital mobility 
We consider now the case of a low degree of inflation-targeting flexibility or the case of an 
aggressive response of central bank toward inflation (or a conservative central banker in 
the sense of Rogoff). In this case central bank is more concerned about keeping inflation as 
close as possible to a given inflation target than about output target. In other words, the 
smaller the parameter λ  is, the less flexible will be the inflation-targeting regime. This case 
corresponds to the following condition:  
     βλ /1< .                            (11) 
Under condition (11), the slope of both 0=s&  and 0=π&  locus are downward sloping, 
and the 0=π&  locus is steeper than the 0=s&  locus (see Figure 1b). The system will have one 
equilibrium that can be stable or unstable. In this case, central banks nominal interest rate 
reacts aggressively to inflation rate. Thus, a sharp increase in nominal interest rate increasing 
operational costs of firms in terms of debt services could force some firms into insolvency, 
leading thus to a reduced competition in prices and higher inflation pressure. This 
inflationary pressure can be predictable by economic agents increasing probably their 
demand for loans, generating thus a further inflationary pressure. In this respect, many of 
emerging market economies (i.e., Latin American countries during the 1980s) and transition 
economies (i.e., Eastern European countries in 1990s) provide examples in which a sharp 
increase in nominal interest rate is not able to reduce inflation expectations and inflation rate. 
In fact, this analysis seems to be suitable in many of these countries with insufficiently 
developed and fragile monetary and financial markets. On the other hand, real exchange rate 
reactions depending on the degree of capital mobility can moderate or accentuate the optimal 
nominal interest rate reaction and the destabilising forces. With a low capital mobility, the 
effects of real exchange rate happen to moderate the inflation effects on the interest rate. 
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With a high capital mobility, the strong effects on the exchange rate are more than necessary 
in order to compensate the effects of inflation and make thus the economy unstable.  
Consequently, the risk of an economic instability appears in the case of a high degree of 
capital mobility. In fact, persistent shocks leading to a continual gap between inflation and 
inflation target induce the doubt of private sector on the inflation target announced by the 
central bank. When interest rate and inflation rate react strongly to shocks under a low degree 
of flexibility in inflation targeting (i.e., an aggressive central bank toward inflation), private 
sector will adapt its expectations taking into consideration a predictable evolution of inflation 
(i.e., a lack of credibility in the inflation-targeting regime). A deviating path of expected 
inflation rate can be self-fulfilling in this model where central banks adopt a low degree of 
inflation-targeting flexibility attributing a high priority to the inflation stabilisation. In this 
respect, to stabilise the economy, it seems necessary to moderate the exchange rate reactions 
by limiting the degree of capital mobility. This result seems to be supported by evidence 
provided recently by von Hagen and Zhou (2005), suggesting that policymakers have a 
tendency to utilise capital controls to help manage the exchange rate regimes.  
More specifically, the economy can become stable if some constraint on the degree of 
capital account liberalisation or capital mobility is introduced. In other words, under the 
condition (11), one has 0<Ω , 01 >Φ , 02 >Φ , and it yields  
       
0
2
1
0
<
Φ
Φ
−=
π
=sds
d
&
,     0
)/( 2
1
0
<
Φ+φγβ−
Φ
−=
π
=π&dx
d
     
and   
00 =π=
π
<
π
&&
ds
d
ds
d
s
.  
The state matrix in equation (9) has a positive determinant, i.e., 0)det( 11 >ΩΦ−=Α
− , and its 
trace is indefinite. Under a low degree of inflation-targeting flexibility and for reasonable 
values of parameter β , it can be shown that there is a case where the trace of the state matrix 
may be negative: 01 21 <ΦβΩ
φγ
+
Ω
−Φ . Consequently, the system will possess two stable 
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eigenvalues. This case can be worrying for economists in a framework with forward-looking 
variables. With two stable eigenvalues, the transversality condition can no longer determine a 
unique initial condition for the two variables.  In this case, a decrease of capital mobility will 
reduce the reactivity of the exchange rate to a variety of news, and so its behaviour will be 
like that of a predetermined variable. Hence, if the decrease of the degree of capital mobility 
is not satisfactory, central bank must intervene in order to avoid the exchange rate jumps 
permitting the economy to find its unique adjustment path. Therefore, one can consider that 
there are two state predetermined variables and the behaviour of the economy is stable or 
cyclically stable.  Thus, the trace condition can be rewritten as (see Appendix C):  
                                      0   21 <Ψ−+Ψ ys ηγηυ ,                                                      (12)  
where    [ ] 0] )1()1(/[)1()1()1(1 >++−++++−=Ψ βφββββφγβγβ zzz ,   
              zzz  )1()1(/)1(2 φββφ ++−−=Ψ ;    with  λβ/1=z   and  10 2 <Ψ< . 
To illustrate our proposition, we consider two extreme values of the degree of capital 
mobility (or capital account liberalisation). The first one is the case of perfect capital mobility 
( ∞→υ ) and, the second one is the case of total absence of capital mobility ( 0=υ ).  In the 
first case ( ∞→υ ), it is straightforward to show that the condition of negative trace and 
therefore the dynamic stability conditions are not fulfilled and thus the economy could allow 
for any unstable path. In the second case ( 0=υ ), the negative trace condition seems to be 
satisfied, but only under the following condition:  
                                            ys ηγη   2Ψ< .                                                           (13) 
This condition can be satisfied, when in a context of exchange rate uncertainty under flexible 
exchange rates, the trade balance is not very sensitive to exchange rate changes (i.e., the 
parameter sη is small) and/or when the trade balance is very sensitive to revenue variations 
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(i.e., the parameter yη is high). Once condition (13) is accepted, condition (12) makes 
obligatory the afterwards restriction on the degree of capital mobility  
                                               12 /)  ( Ψ−Ψ< sy ηηγυ ,                                                   (14) 
in order to guarantee the macroeconomic stability in this open economy. Therefore, under 
conditions (13) and (14), the economy can be dynamically stable and when the trace is near 
to zero, the system can adopt a cyclical behaviour. In addition, a small interest elasticity in 
money market (φ ) and a high interest rate elasticity in goods market (β ) seems to be 
stabilising factors in the case of a low degree of flexibility in inflation targeting.  In fact, the 
degree of capital mobility (υ ) plays its role through the impacts on nominal and real 
exchange rates. A higher degree of capital mobility will generate excessive short-run 
movements of nominal and real exchange rates. That can destabilise the economy through 
excessive reactions of current and expected inflation rates and nominal interest rate. 
Consequently, a further financial development (a greater β ) and the reduction of interest 
elasticity in money market (a smaller φ )5 are favourable for a lower degree of flexibility in 
inflation targeting (conservative central bank) without destabilising the economy. Therefore, 
countries that have not liberalised and developed their internal monetary and financial 
markets are less able to apply a low degree of flexibility in inflation targeting. Otherwise, 
they must put up restrictions in their capital mobility. Nevertheless, restrictions in capital 
movements correspond to an economic distortion. It is an implication of the theory of second 
best that removing one distortion need not be welfare enhancing when other distortions are 
present. In this case, imposing stability conditions may be a better choice due to the gain 
resulting from macroeconomic stability than totally liberalising the capital account.  
 
                                                 
5 Empirical studies on money demand following financial deregulation and innovation and the development of 
largely open money market for short-run monetary assets (in 1980-1990) confirm this hypothesis. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the stability in a simple dynamic open economy macro model, in 
which monetary authorities adopt an inflation-targeting regime to guide the conduct of their 
policy in an environment with a liberalised capital account and flexible exchange rates. We examine 
the stability conditions in a framework where inflation targeting is an essential part of a three-
part policy (or trinity) that also includes flexible exchange rate and capital mobility. Also, a 
rule governing growth path of money supply consistent with the inflation target is imposed to 
improve credibility. We show that stability conditions depend on the degree of flexibility in 
inflation targeting and the degree of capital mobility under monetary policy discretion. When 
central bank adopts a high degree of inflation-targeting flexibility (when central bank is 
principally concerned about output), the economy find a saddle-point equilibrium and a 
unique stable path can be determined for economic variables. In this case, stability could be 
consistent with any degree of capital mobility under flexible exchange rate regime. On the 
other hand, if central bank adopts a low degree of inflation targeting flexibility (if central 
bank is principally concerned about keeping inflation as close as possible to a given inflation 
target), a stable equilibrium is possible only under the condition of capital mobility 
restrictions. Consequently, it seems necessary to limit the degree of capital mobility in order 
to maintain stability in countries opening their economies to capital flows under flexible 
exchange rates, such as in emerging market and transition economies. According to this 
analysis, how an inflation-targeting regime can be adopted by emerging market and transition 
economies depends on their structural characteristics. The more developed domestic 
monetary and financial markets are, the higher weight the central bank can put on inflation 
target (i.e., the more aggressive inflation targeting) without destabilising the economy and 
imposing any restriction on capital mobility. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of the optimal monetary policy rule 
The first order condition of central banks minimisation problem (5) is: 
0/ =∂∂ πL
   
⇒
 
0)()( =π−π+
π∂
∂
−λ TT yyy .                       (A.1) 
Using then equation (2) and the result 1=
π∂
∂y  obtained from equation (1), we obtain:  
{ } 0)( )( =π−π+ε+−γ+π−β−λ TdTe ysi .                     (A.2) 
Equation (A.2) gives, under the assumption 0=Ty , the following central banks optimal 
monetary policy rule: 
]    )(
 
1   [1 d
Te si ε+π−π
λ
+γβ+π= ,                   (A.3) 
Under rational expectations and transitory shocks, one has 0)( =πεE . Thus, we obtain from 
equation (1), 0=ey . Using this result and solving (A.1) for eπ  yield: 
Te ππ = .             (A.4) 
According to (A.4), time-consistent inflation rate expectations of private sector are equal to 
the central banks inflation target.  Thus, using equation (A.4), we can express the interest 
rate rule (7) in another way as follows: 






ε+π−π
λ
+γβ+π= d
TT si )(1 1 .                     (A.5) 
 
Appendix B. Derivation of the two differential equations of (9) 
 
 i) The differential equation for inflation rate  (π& ): 
Solving equations (1) and (2) to eliminate the expected inflation rate, eπ , yields: 
     
[ ] dsiy εββ
γ
επβ
β
π 





+
+





+
+−−





+
−=
1
1
11
 .                     (B.1) 
Taking the derivative of (B.1) with respect to time, t, and using y
dt
dy
&≡ , π≡≡ p
dt
dp
& , 
π
π
&≡
dt
d , s
dt
ds
&≡  and ,yε& 0=dε&  (i.e., white noise shocks), we can write:  
( ) siy &&&& β+
γ
+π−β+
β
−=
11
.
                      
(B.2) 
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Using µ≡≡ mdt
dm
&  and taking the derivative of equations (4) and (A.5) with    respect to 
time, t, we get respectively:  
         
miy εφπµ &&& +−=− ,             (B.3)
                       and         π
λβ+β
γ
= &&&
1si .                 (B.4)  
Combining (B.2) and (B.4), we obtain:  
.11
11
1
1
π





−
λββ+
β
−=β+
γ
+





π−π
λβ+β
γ
β+
β
−= &&&&&& ssy               (B.5) 
Finally substituting i& from (B.4) and y&  from (B.5) into (B.3) yields: 
mm ss εβ
φγ
πλβ
φ
λββ
β
επλββ
γφπλββ
β
πµ &&&&&&& +−






+





−
+
−=+





+−





−
+
−=− 11
1
111
1
, 
which can be rewritten as  
            






−+−
Ω
= ms εβ
φγ
πµπ &&& 1 ,   where   
λβ
φ
−





−
λββ+
β
−≡Ω 11
1
.                         (B.6) 
Equation (B.6) implies that in steady state (i.e., 0=== sy &&&π ) money supply growth rate 
must be equal to inflation target: Tπµ = . The monetary authorities are assumed in the short 
run to adopt a money growth rule consistent with their inflation target and the long-run 
equilibrium: mm
T εµεπµ && +=+= . The linear form of (B.6) around the steady state 
( is   and    , π ) is: 
  
s&& βΩ
φγ
+π−π
Ω
−=π )(1 .             (B.7) 
 
ii) The differential equation for real exchange rate ( s& ) 
Using rational expectations (i.e., eee && = ), ππ +−=+−= ff sppse &&&&& , and equations (1) and 
(2), we rewrite equation (3) as follows:  
[ ]
υ
εη
βυ
εεπβγη
ππ π fsdyff
sis
iis
+
+
+
++−−
−−+−=
)1(
)(
&                (B.8)     
The linear approximation of (B.8) at the steady state ( is   and    , π ) is given by 
    )()(
1
)(
1
)( ssssiiiis sy −
υ
η
+





−β+
γ
+π+π−−β+
β
−
υ
η
−π−π−−=& .      
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Using then the optimal interest rate rule (7), one has )(1)( π−π
λβ+−β
γ
=− ssii , we can 
rewrite the above equation as:  
                           ).(11
)1(
1)( π−π





−
λβ




υβ+
βη
++−





υ
η
+β
γ
=
ys sss&            (B.9) 
The dynamic behaviour of the economy can be summarized by the two first-order differential 
equations (B.7) and (B.9) in matrix form: 
   










π−π
−








ΦβΩ
φγ
+
Ω
−ΦβΩ
φγ
ΦΦ
=










π
sss
 1   
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&
&
.                     (B.10) 
where  01 >+=Φ υ
η
β
γ s  and 





υβ+
βη
+





−
λβ=Φ )1(11
1
2
y .  
 
Appendix C.  Trace condition of the state matrix when 1 1 >
λβ  
When 11 >
λβ , it is easy to show that 01
1
1
<
λβ
φ
−





−
λββ+
β
−=Ω .   
Noting for simplicity 
λβ=
1z , the trace condition, 0 
 
 1
21 <ΦΩβ
φγ
+
Ω
−Φ , is rewritten as:  
  0
])1()1([
)1(
])1()1([
)1()1()1(
<φβ++−βυ
γη−φ
−
υ
η
+βφβ++−β
ββ++φγβ++−γβ
zz
z
zz
z ys .          (C.1) 
 
Multiplying both sides of (C.1) by υ  and regrouping, we get:  
 
    0 21 <γηΨ−η+Ψυ ys                   (C.2) 
 
 where 0
])1()1([
)1()1()1(
1 >βφβ++−β
ββ++φγβ++−γβ
=Ψ
zz
z , and 0 
)1()1(
)1(
2 >φβ++−β
−φ
=Ψ
zz
z .  
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